The late detection of security threats causes a significant increase in the risk of irreparable damages and restricts any defense attempt. In this paper, we propose a sCAlable TRAffic Classifier and Analyzer (CATRACA). CATRACA works as an efficient online Intrusion Detection and Prevention System implemented as a Virtualized Network Function. CATRACA is based on Apache Spark, a Big Data Streaming processing system, and it is deployed over the Open Platform for Network Functions Virtualization (OPNFV), providing an accurate real-time threat-detection service. The system presents a friendly graphical interface that provides real-time visualization of the traffic and the attacks that occur in the network. Our prototype can differentiate normal traffic from denial of service (DoS) attacks and vulnerability probes over 95% accuracy under three different datasets. Moreover, CATRACA handles streaming data under concept drift detection with more than 85% of accuracy. 
FIGURE 1 CATRACA as a Virtual Network Function. CATRACA sensors mirror traffic to Apache Kafka. Network packets are summarized as flows, which Apache Spark analyzes. Machine Learning models are obtained and stored in the Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) and results are displayed in the ElasticStack middlebox platforms come with high Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) and Operational Expenditures (OPEX). In this way, the Network Function Virtualization (NFV) comes to leverage standard virtualization technology into the network core and to merge network equipment into commodity server hardware. 21 In NFV, the network functions are deployed into a virtualized environment and is thus called Virtual Network Functions (VNF).
Virtual network functions (VNF) are virtual machines performing functions on the network layer to replace the numerous hardware-specific middleboxes. Moreover, Service Function Chaining (SFC) allows an infrastructure provider to select the appropriate VNF from multivendor
implementations. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and a Firewall is a good example of a service function chaining. 20 CATRACA aims to use NFV technology and its cluster infrastructure to combine virtualization, cloud computing, and distributed stream processing to monitor network traffic. The objective is to provide an accurate, scalable, and real-time threat detection facility capable of attending usage peaks. The traffic monitoring and threat detection as a virtualized network function present two main advantages: capacity self-adaptation to different traffic network load and high localization flexibility to place or move network sensors reducing latency.
CATRACA is deployed as a Virtual Network Function (VNF) as shown in Figure 1 . CATRACA sensors are deployed in virtual networks. The goal of the sensors is to mirror traffic to CATRACA cloud. CATRACA cloud is composed of Apache Kafka that receives the mirrored traffic and sends it to Apache Spark, responsible for data processing. Apache Spark creates a machine learning model that is stored in the Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS), and finally, results are displayed in the ElasticStack that contains the Elastic Search and Kibana for data visualization.
The CATRACA architecture is composed of three layers: Visualization Layer, Processing Layer, and Capture Layer, as shown in Figure 2 
FIGURE 2
The layered architecture of the CATRACA system: the capture layer, the processing layer, and the visualization layer. The capture layer abstracts network packets into stream flows. All operations such data preprocessing, machine learning, and data enrichment are implemented in the processing layer. Visualization layer stores data and graphically displays the results A dedicated cloud for classification hosts the Processing Layer, and its core is the Apache Spark. We choose Spark framework among the different stream-processing platforms because it presents the best fault tolerance performance, 22 making CATRACA more robust in case of failure. Spark runs in a cluster following the master/slave model, where slaves can expand and reduce resources, providing scalability to the system. Once a flow arrives in the Processing Layer, a data preprocessing method normalizes and selects the most critical features for threat classification. Finally, CATRACA classifies flows as malicious or benign through machine learning (ML) algorithms based on decision trees.
CATRACA runs in two modes: offline and online modes. Offline mode analyzes stored big security datasets which are time invariable. Figure 3 shows Once the data are ready, the Divide Data function divides them into training and testing sets in a rate of 70% for training and 30%
for testing. The training set feeds the Create Model function that creates the machine learning model. In CATRACA, we use decision tree as the machine learning mechanism. After creating the model, we store it in the HDFS for further use. Finally, the Classify function obtain the model and evaluate it against the testing set. This function also compares the predicted values with the original dataset classes, and the metrics such as accuracy, precision, and F1-score are obtained. The metrics are finally stored also in the Hadoop Distributed File System.
CATRACA online mode is presented in Figure 4 . This mode works similarly than the offline mode. In contrast to the offline mode that analyzes static data, online mode processes streaming dynamic data. As a result, the streaming data are unlabeled data as they arrive with no class annotation since they are created in real-time. First, the getStream function get the streaming of flow messages that came from Apache Kafka.
The function defines the parameters of the Apache Kafka receiver inside the Apache Spark. Then, the convert2JSON function process the streaming data and parses them to the JavaScript Object Notation (JSON), which is easier to handle. ExtractIPs function get the IPs source and destination address from each flow; these IPs are passed to the addLocation where the geographical coordinates of each IP are added. On the other side, the features without the IP addresses are inputs for to the convert2float function. This function transforms all data into float values. Next, the Matrix Reducer function is inherited from the offline mode. This function takes the stored indexes from the HDFS, which function sets the parameters and adapts the data to send to ElasticSearch.
Our system enriches original metadata with information to enhance the quality of the detection. The idea behind enrichment is to add information in the streaming data about the environment of the attack. We first extract the IP address, and we add the geographical location of the analyzed IPs. With this information, our system can detect attacks in different geographical location and have a global view of the attack. As a consequence, a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), for example, is easier to detect. Other sorts of meta-data can enrich the streaming data such as the timestamp of the processed flow, which would let us handle the data as a time series. Moreover, information about the user, such as if it is a residential or a corporate user, increases the knowledge about an attack.
Finally, the Visualization Layer deploys ElasticStack and Kibana. The ElasticStack allows real-time custom event viewing. Thus, the output of the Processing Layer follows to the ElasticSearch, ‡ ‡ which provides a fast search and storage service. A user interface runs in the Kibana environment, which communicates with the stored data in ElasticSearch through queries. The combination allows exposing the results in real-time.
CATRACA EVALUATION
CATRACA runs on the top of the Open Platform for Network Function Virtualization (OPNFV). We perform the experiments in the OPNFV Danube 2.0 environment. Our OPNFV environment runs on five bare-metal servers, two controllers, two compute nodes with 96 GB of RAM, 700 TB of storage, and 128 cores of Intel Xeon processors with a clock frequency of 2.6 GHz. Besides, fuel manager runs on a Quad-core, 4-GB RAM, 128-GB SDD storage with three network interfaces of 1/GBs.
We use machine learning algorithms against three different datasets to evaluate CATRACA. The NSL-KDD dataset is a modification of the original KDD-99 dataset and presents the same 41 features and the same five classes, Denial of Service (DoS), Probe, Root2Local (R2L), User2Root (U2R) and normal, as the KDD 99. 23 The NSL-KDD dataset was improved when compared with original KDD 99. Improvements of the NSL-KDD over KDD 99 are the elimination of redundant and duplicate samples, to avoid a biased classification and overfitting, and a better cross-class balancing to avoid random selection. The second dataset is the GTA/UFRJ § § that combines real network traffic captured from a laboratory and network threats produced in a controlled environment. 24 Network traffic is abstracted in 26 features and contains three classes, DoS, probe, and normal traffic. The third dataset is the NetOp, ¶ ¶ a real dataset from a Brazilian operator. 25 The Table 1 .
In this work, we present three use cases of CATRACA. The first two present CATRACA when it runs in offline mode, and the last one shows the streaming behavior of CATRACA. As a consequence, we first analyze real network traffic dataset. After, we compare the performance of three machine learning algorithms in three different security network datasets. Finally, we evaluate CATRACA when handling streaming data.
Offline dataset evaluation use case
We use CATRACA to analyze and characterize the NetOp dataset. The NetOp dataset is a big dataset obtained from real network traffic. With big dataset, a computer cluster must be used to introduce low latency when processing the data. A previous work 25 analyzed just one day of the network traffic.
In this paper, we analyze the entire dataset, in total of one full week. We loaded the entire dataset into the Hadoop File Distributed The relation between the most accessed services and flow duration are shown in Figure 7A and 7B. The duration of the analyzed flows is less than 40 ms, characterizing the use of DNS, HTTP, and HTTPS services. Regarding the protocols used, the prevalence of UDP flows is evident and refers to DNS queries. It is worth mentioning that the number of alerts generated by UDP flows is more than 10 times greater than the number of alerts generated by TCP flows. Another important point is that the number of flows that generate alerts is approximately 26% of total flows. probe or scans attacks that send small amounts of packets to discover target vulnerabilities. In Figure 8B , alerts and normal traffic show a similar pattern of 11% of flows. However, alerts use more than 100 Bytes in more than 30% of flows.
Considering the amount of data transferred in each flow, Figure 9 compares the round-trip flows concerning volume in bytes. The disparity of the traffic volume in both directions of communication is evident. While, in one way, 95% of traffic presents a maximum volume of 100 B; in the other way, the same traffic share presents up more than 500 B. This result demonstrates that the residential broadband user profile is a content consumer. Another point is that the flows that generate alerts have a similar traffic volume profile in both directions. Asymmetric traffic is more typical of legitimate users. Figure 10 shows the behavior of the subflows generated in each connection. A new subflow is created whenever a flow reaches the idle state.
Both Figure 10A and 10B, subflow size in uplink and downlink, show a very similar behavior. Over 20% of normal traffic flows reach 900 B, but Figure 9 , where flow size in Bytes are shown. Flows are short duration, as evidenced in Figure 7A , do not pass to the idle state, and thus, do not generate subflows.
Another important feature is the total amount of data in packet headers. Figure 11 shows that, in both directions, alert and normal flows have the same behavior. In particular, there is symmetry in the round-trip traffic regarding the volume of data in the headers. It highlights that malicious traffic does not rely on the usage of header options. Moreover, in both directions, uplink and downlink show similar behavior. Until 90 Bytes per header alerts and normal traffic are similar, however, with 900 Bytes headers, it represents almost 30% of normal traffic and close to 60% of alerts flows. Spark run as independent processes in the cluster which are coordinated by the master node. The master node receives the application split it into tasks. Moreover, the manager node is responsible for scheduling tasks in the worker nodes. Once the worker finished the assigned task, the results are reported to the manager node. We train a decision tree algorithm to obtain the classification model, and we store it in the Hadoop distributed file system (HDFS). The manager will be responsible for loading the newly published model and deploying to the worker nodes.
Results were obtained with 10-fold cross-validation, in four virtual machines (VM), one Spark master and three Spark slaves, using Ubuntu 16.04 with 4 GB of RAM and two cores for each VM.
We compare the performance of the machine learning algorithms for traffic classification use case. Descendent, and Decision Tree. For the training set, we choose the day 25/2 of NetOp dataset since it is the day that contains the most significant amount of flows. Moreover, we validate the performance under 10-fold cross-validation. Results are shown in Figure 13 . Figure 13A shows the performance of four evaluation metrics Accuracy, Precision, Sensitivity, and F1-Score, while Figure 13B presents a comparison between Training and Classification Times, in which time is represented in a logarithmic scales. As we can see, Decision Tree presents the best performance under the four evaluated metrics. Even if Decision Tree does not present the smallest training time, the performance presented during the classification time is one of the best.
The decision tree classification algorithm runs in the core of CATRACA for a good trade-off between its training/classification times allied to its high accuracy and precision. The decision tree is a greedy algorithm that performs a recursive binary partitioning of the resource space. Each sheet, in CATRACA, a feature, or a combination of them is chosen by selecting the best separation from a set of possible divisions, to maximize the gain of information in a tree node. The division into each node of the tree is chosen from the argmax d GI (CD, d) , where argmax is the point where function gets its maximum value and GI(CD, d) is the information gain when a division d applies to a set of CD data. The idea of the algorithm is to find the best division between features to classify threats. For that, we use the heuristic of Information Gain. The gain of information GI of the system CATRACA is the impurity of Gini,
, which indicates how separated the classes are, where f i is the frequency of class i in a node and C is the number of classes. The model is stored in the file system and loaded in to be used in real-time traffic classification mode online. Thus, it is also possible to validate the model with the 30% test set obtained earlier. Tables 2, 3 , and 4 show the confusion matrix of the three evaluated datasets. We consider a network flow sampling as a sliding window of 2 s duration since Lobato et al suggest that it is the best trade-off between classification accuracy and decision latency. 24 The confusion matrix specifies the rate of false positives and other metrics of each class in the test data set. The rows represent the elements that belong to the real class, and the columns represent the elements that were classified as belonging to the class. Therefore, the prominent diagonal elements of this array represent the number of elements that are correctly classified. Moreover, the tables present metrics complementary to the confusion matrix. By observing the values of Accuracy and Precision, it is possible to see the good performance of the decision tree algorithm in off-line ## Mainly used for remote configuration of network equipment. classification. Table 2 presents the results for the NSL-KDD dataset. The table verified that the algorithm presented a high accuracy in almost all classes, with a low false positive rate. Another way to see the false positive rate is to observe the values outside the main diagonal. Root to Local (R2L) and User to Root (U2R) classes present the lowest values of recall and precision. These two classes are the most infrequent in the dataset.
Thus, the classifier confuses the most imbalanced classes. One solution to this problem is to use dataset balancer such as Synthetic Minority class Oversampling TEchnique (SMOTE) 27 or Adaptive Synthetic (ADASYN) Sampling Approach. 28 Table 3 shows the same evaluation for the UFRJ/GTA dataset. In this dataset, the worst precision was Scan class. As we can see in the main diagonal of the matrix, the machine learning algorithm misclassified mostly all scan class with DoS. We believe the synthetic nature of the attacks causes the behavior above. All DoS attacks were created with random parameters. Thus, parameters such as source IP addresses or ports can be forged. Sommer and Paxson 29 have already identified this effect with an artificial dataset. Finally, a similar result is shown in Table 4 , where NetOp dataset was used to evaluate the decision tree. This dataset contains two classes, threat and normal. We can see that the false positives, the values outside the main diagonal, also increase; however, the overall accuracy increases.
After obtaining the classification model from the historical base, one can evaluate the accuracy of the system with data arriving in real time.
The operation of the CATRACA system in real time uses the stream module of the Spark platform. Thus, abstracted packets in streams, captured on different virtual machines in the cloud, are processed as they reach the Spark platform. In CATRACA, we consider a flow as a stream. When a stream arrives at the detection system, it is summarized in characteristics using a feature selection algorithm, to reduce processing time. Thus, the vector of selected features is evaluated in the model obtained in the off-line processing. After extracting the analytic data from the flows, the results are stored in a database for further analysis. The stored data contain the information collected during the detection of threats and can be reprocessed offline to calculate the parameters to be used in the real-time model. To make the system more accurate, when a new threat is detected, offline parameters are updated, obtained feedback between online and offline detection.
We measure the performance of CATRACA concerning processing throughput and processing time per message. We inject the GTA/UFRJ dataset into the system in its totality and replicated as many times as necessary. As the processing layer of the proposed system consumes a message at a time, the method is still being stream processing. The whole dataset is injected in the Kafka message service, but the processing engine consumes micro-batches at a time. Although this setup avoids the evaluation of the total latency from the data generation until the data consumption and the processed result, it assures that the processing engine always has enough incoming data to reach its maximum throughput and to reach the worst-case scenario processing time per sample. The experiment calculates the consumption and processing rate of the entire system. We consider a scale-out strategy to evaluate the speed-up factor that CATRACA reaches. We add new processing cores to the cluster and evaluate the time for processing messages on new architectures in relation to a serial architecture. Figure 14 shows the results of the throughput experiment. In the y-axis, it is shown the throughput as the number of flows processed per second by the system. The throughput reaches the maximum at 20 cores available. This upper-bound is due to the trade-off between communication overhead and the portion of the code that benefits from the parallelism. We also estimate the speed-up in latency of the system. The speed-up factor is given by S latency =
La1 La2
, where La1 is the latency of the system when parallelism is equal to one and La2 is the latency of the system with the variation of the parallelism parameter. Latency is the processing time per message, which accounts for the difference between the time a message arrives at the processing and the time it leaves. Figure 14B compares the evaluated speed-up curve and the estimated Amdahl's Law for the theoretical speed-up of the system. The Amdahl's Law 30 is given by S latency (s) =
, where s is the number of processing cores that are running the task, p is the parallel portion of the task, and S latency is the theoretical speed-up in latency. In order to estimate the parallel portion of the task, we fit the Amdahl's Law to the experimental curve. We achieve the best fit for the experimental speed-up curve using the least square method. The fitting reveals that the p = 0.815, which means that approximately 80% of the task runs in parallel, while 20% is serial, much of which is due to communication overhead. Figure 14C and reaches the minimum at 20-cores parallelism. Moreover, the latency speed factor with a parallelism of twenty is reached around 4.65, and this indicates that the system can parallelize almost five times with twenty virtual machines running one core each.
Real-time visualization of enriched data
The visualization of the enriched data occurs through a simple and friendly web interface to allow the user to monitor the different parameters of the network in real time. The open source viewer Kibana, a component of the Elastic stack, was used for the development of the web interface, as it allows the visualization of the data in a fast and straightforward way allied to the performance of processing of queries with large volumes of data with low latency. Figure 15 reveals some of the different scenarios shown in the control panel, such as the most accessed destination/source ports, the most used destination IP addresses, the average size of the flows in the round-trip directions, and the number of analyzed flows, among others. It is worth emphasizing the visualization of the attacks in progress through a map that portrays the origin, the destination, and the number of occurrences.
It is possible for the enrichment of the data through the correlation with geolocation metadata in the processing module. ‖‖ Thus, both data and threats are viewed in real time. Moreover, all data are stored with a timestamp, allowing the processing of the data through time series.
Analyzing streaming data use case
In stream processing Machine Learning methods, data arrive continuously, one sample at the time. Stream processing methods must process data under strict constraints of time and resources. Nevertheless, in case of a change in the stationary behavior of the sample statistics, the classification may present low accuracy, a behavior known as concept drift. An adaptive Machine Learning approach is necessary to ensure that the model is up-to-date. The adaptive approach must detect a change in data when new data is available. Since model training is resource consuming, we must ensure that a new model is essential. In an occurrence of concept drift, we must train a new model. We use the approach presented in Figure 16 to detect concept drift. Gray boxes present the batch processing, while the white boxes represent the streaming data. As a result, a new model must be obtained from the values of the window w i . We consider concept-drift, as represented in Equation (2), where
In the experiment, we measure the impact of the concept-drift on the final accuracy. We analyze one day from NetOp dataset. As NetOp dataset contains labeled data, we can measure the model accuracy. In production environments, where labeled data are expensive, periodical re-training is usually performed. Periodical re-training can be unnecessary when the model remains unchanged. Other unsupervised approaches consider unlabeled data. Statistical comparison of arriving samples or clustering sample, with those samples used to train the system, assumes that a concept-drift is detected whenever new groups are found on new data. 31, 32 These methods are resource consuming since measures based on distances are performed over arrived samples. We use decision tree machine learning algorithm. To perform the training in the first window, M is established in 10 000 samples, and we variate the value of N in 500, 1000, 2000, and 5000 samples. Moreover, we also variate the value of from 80%, 85%, 90%, and 95% of accuracy. The lower is the value of , the more the monitoring is permissive, and the more significant is the value of , the more the system is rigorous. As NetOp dataset is real traffic for a network operator, no ground truth is presented for concept-drift detection. Thus, our definition of concept-drift is based on the degradation of the prediction performance. Figure 17 shows the monitoring of the concept drift. For display purposes, we limited the number of windows to 1000. In Figure 17A , we see the accuracy behavior of a window with 500 samples. The variation of the value shows a deep impact on accuracy. With a very strict value of = 95%, the model is invalid for further windows, and accuracy maintains a value lower than 0.3. Similar behavior is shown with a value of = 90%. A value = 85% shows an improvement; however, after a small number of windows, = 85% also maintains a low accuracy. The best results are shown with = 80%, a more permissive value. This value allows performing an accuracy higher than 78% for over 600 window steps. Nevertheless, in CATRACA, we need to reach high accuracy. An improvement in accuracy is reached in Figure 17B , with a = 80%, the system was able to maintain accuracy over 70% during all the experiments. Similar than before, stricter values of do not perform correctly. Figure 17C and 17D show an interesting behavior. In Figure 17C , the values of 80% and 85% if overlap, maintaining high accuracy over 70%.
With a sample of 5000, in Figure 17D , the overlap is produced by three values, 80%, 85%, and 90% of values. Nonetheless, the strict value of 95 follows a similar behavior at the beginning, and even if this value presents a low accuracy during a small period, = 90% presents the highest accuracy of all the experiment.
In this experiment, we show the impact of the concept drift detection on the variation in the sliding window and the accuracy. In Figure 18A is presented the number of concepts drift detected while varying the sliding window and the value. On the other hand, in Figure 18 is analyzed the mean accuracy when varying the same parameters. With a strict value of = 95% and with a sliding window of 500, a high rate of concept drift is detected. However, when compared with the same values in Figure 18 , the mean accuracy is below 0.35. Differently, with a more permissive value of = 80%, the concept drift detection is below 500 in the whole dataset. Nevertheless, the accuracy with the same values is under 0.4. With a permissive value of = 80%, no concept drift is detected, but the accuracy is kept in more than 70%. We conclude that a good performance is presented when the sliding window contains N samples that tend to be high and with a more permissive value of . (A) (B) FIGURE 18 A good performance is presented when the sliding window contains a number of samples N that tends to be high and with a more permissive value of . A, Relation of concept drift detection and value; B, Mean accuracy with the variation of value As NetOp dataset is a real network traffic trace collection, there is no ground-truth knowledge for how many concept drifts. Thus, we compare our concept-drift detection dataset with the Page-Hinkley (PH) test. Page-Hinkley is a technique used to detect modifications of a signal processing assuming a Gaussian distribution produced it. For every sample x i , PH test calculates a cumulative variable m n based on the Equation (3). The variable m n is the difference between the sample x i , Equation (4) , and the mean of the last n observed valuesx n . If the difference is smaller to a value , a concept drift is detected. The value corresponds to the magnitude of changes that are allowed. In the experiments, we use = 0.005 and = 50. We use the decision tree algorithm as a machine learning model for classification
We compare our proposal with the PH test in three different datasets. One day of NetOp dataset, validating the previous results, NSL KDD, and SpamsAssasins dataset. 33 NSL KDD and SpamsAssisins are used in the work of Sethi and Kantardzic 32 to detect concept drift in unlabeled data. Table 5 represents the results obtained. Table 6 shows the comparison of our proposal with Page-Hinkley test in NSL-KDD and SpamsAssasins datasets. We see that our approach does not achieve to detect concept-drift with small windows size. Nevertheless, our approach detects only one concept drift in all window size. On the other hand, for bigger windows size, our approach outperforms Page-Hinkle test. In NSL-KDD dataset, the accuracy of our approach remains constant in 0.98, and for PH test, the best accuracy 0.53 with a window size of 100. In SpamAssassin, 
CONCLUSION
CATRACA system proposed a virtualized network function for real-time and offline threat detection. We perform threat detection using machine learning algorithms running on a stream processing platform. The proposed system achieves threat analysis on incoming traffic in real time or on a historical base in differentiated time. CATRACA runs in two different modes online and offline. Thus, we applied three different uses cases. The first use case analyzes and characterizes a network operator big dataset. The second use case performs traffic classification under three different security datasets. Finally, the last use case shows the behavior of CATRACA when dealing with stream data in real time. Our system was able to adapt the classifiers under concept drifting, a change in the relationships between the created model and output data. The system runs on OPNFV open source platform as a virtual network function and displays the knowledge extracted from the enriched data through a friendly graphical interface for viewing different analyses and the geographical location of the source and destination of the threats in real time. The system can be obtained at http://www.gta.ufrj.br/catraca, where the user manual, which details the procedures of installation and use of the system, the documentation, which allows understanding the project and more details about the system code, as well as other useful information are provided.
